The Classical View of
Categorization
Traditionally, categories were assumed
to be isomorphic with respect to the definite structures, properties, and
interrelationships of the "real" world. An old and influential idea is
that the properties contained in these categories are singly necessary
and jointly sufficient to define membership. Although other properties
may be allocated randomly, natural categories will always include a set
of "essential" or "criterial" features.
Categorization refers to the extraction
of these "critical" features by the application of a predefined interactive
algorithm of the mind. According to this classical or "Lockean" position,
categorization is conceptual; it is an inferential process that works on
the arbitrary perceptual categories of the world. Needless to say, such
categorizing powers were assigned to the human mind alone.
In the midst of our century, the
dominance of the classical view has been seriously undermined by the collective
work of philosophers (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1953; Ryle, 1949), linguists,
and psychologists (Rosch, 1975; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
Wittgenstein, for example, reflected on the polymorphism of common-sense
language concepts, while Rosch and colleagues were able to empirically
support the concept of family resemblance by testing the classification
performance of humans with basic level concepts. The probabilistic or fuzzy
view of categorization that emerged in this study was thought to be a means
of grouping objects that are characterized by large clusters of attributes.
These attributes do not occur in an all-or-none fashion, but recur approximately
in subsequently perceived instances and are oftly perceptually salient.
Comparative psychologists and ethologists
studying the conceptual behavior of animals do not believe in any form
of the classical view. Categorization is assumed to be perceptual, and
all animal experimenters have denied that the boundaries of natural categories
are clear-cut, that membership can be defined by necessary and sufficient
conditions, and that logical rules guide the grouping of objects or events.
Even for humans, the available evidence suggests that group membership
is graded and assessment is based upon characteristic or probable properties
alone.